



National
Foreign
Assessment
Center

Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010038-9

ICC
Secret

NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
ORCON

Africa Review

13 April 1979

Secret

PA AR 79-014
13 April 1979

Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010038-9

Copy

250

Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

**National Security
Information**

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

**Dissemination Control
Abbreviations**

| | |
|--|---|
| NOFORN (NF) | Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals |
| NOCONTRACT (NC) | Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants |
| PROPIN (PP) | Caution—Proprietary Information Involved |
| NFIBONLY (NO) | NFIB Departments Only |
| ORCON (OC) | Dissemination and F unction of Information Controlled by Originator |
| REL... | This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to... |
| FGI | Foreign Government Information |
| <p>This publication is available on microfiche. To get a microfiche copy of this publication call [REDACTED] (OCR/DSB); for future issuances in addition to or in lieu of hard copies, call [REDACTED] (PPG/RD).</p> | |
| <p>Derivative classification by 035653 Review 20 years from date Derived from multiple</p> | |

All material on this page
is unclassified.

SECRET
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON

AFRICA REVIEW (U)

13 April 1979

CONTENTS

Rhodesia: Sithole's Prospects (U) 1

Reverend Ndbaningi Sithole is fighting an uphill battle to maintain his political credibility in the face of heavy competition from his rival, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who is likely to head the government of national unity to be installed in late May or early June. (S)

Rhodesia: Election Timetable (U). 5

South Africa - US: Deteriorating Relations With the United States (U). 7

The expulsion of US diplomats on 12 April makes clear that the short period of South African good will toward the United States that followed Secretary Vance's visit to Pretoria last fall is over and that the South African Government has reverted to the anti-US posturing that marked the 1977 parliamentary election campaign. (S)

Black Africa: Relations With Israel (U) 9

An Israeli delegation headed by Ehud Auriel, an adviser to Foreign Minister Dayan, reportedly was well received in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Liberia, and Togo during a recent official visit, but no promises were made to reestablish diplomatic relations. (C)

SECRET

NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON

Seychelles: Rene's Fears of a Coup (U) 12

The hastily arranged port call at Victoria of a Soviet Kresta-I class cruiser on 10 April was probably prompted by Seychellois President Rene's fears of an externally mounted coup attempt, and could portend closer relations between Moscow and Victoria. (S NF NC OC)

Nigeria: Election Scheduling Problems (U) 14

Head of State Obasanjo's recent announcement that state and national elections will take place at weekly intervals between July and September is the latest indication that Lagos has little appreciation for the immense logistical problems involved in conducting a reasonably efficient election. (S)

FOR THE RECORD (U) 16

ABSTRACT OF RECENT PUBLICATION

A New Government for Uganda (U) 18

SECRET

SECRET
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON

25X1A

Rhodesia: Sithole's Prospects (U)

Reverend Ndbaningi Sithole is fighting an uphill battle to maintain his political credibility in the face of heavy competition from his rival, Bishop Aben Muzorewa, who is likely to head the government of national unity to be installed in late May or early June. Sithole is concerned that he will be excluded from the government if, as seems likely, his party fails to make a good showing in the national election next week. In the hope of improving his electoral prospects, particularly among members of the Ndebele ethnic group, Sithole last week said his party would support bringing guerrilla leader Joshua Nkomo into the new government as president. (S)

Sithole's party is expected to win no more than 20 of the 100 House of Assembly seats next week, and he has little hope of being considered a serious candidate for prime minister. His only chance, and a slim one at that, is to join a coalition with the whites, Chief Ndiweni, and Chief Chirau. Given recent indications of Muzorewa's growing strength and the difficulties Sithole would have in bringing all these parties into a single coalition, prospects of a Sithole-led government now appear very slim. (S)

If Sithole is not a contender for prime minister, he could still be eligible for a major Cabinet post. Under the agreement struck by the internal leaders last fall, any party that wins five seats in the House will be entitled to a Cabinet post. Muzorewa probably would prefer to keep Sithole and his party out of the government altogether, but he is under pressure from some white leaders to offer Sithole the foreign affairs portfolio. His deputies have argued strongly, however, against giving Sithole any position in the Cabinet. If Sithole's party wins a respectable number of seats in next week's election, Muzorewa is committed to give Sithole a Cabinet post, but probably would give him a minor one. (S NF NC OC)

13 April 1979

SECRET


Probable Distribution of Seats in New Rhodesian Parliament



Prime Minister Ian Smith
(Rhodesian Front)
Under pressure from some whites to leave politics, but so far has resisted. Most, if not all, RF candidates are running unopposed.



Bishop Abel Muzorewa
(United African National Council)
Most likely candidate for Prime Minister, but would rather place himself above partisan politics and could opt for the Presidency.



Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole
(Zimbabwe African National Union/Sithole)
Broke with ZANU external organization in 1977. Popularity appears to be on the decline inside Rhodesia.



Chief Kayisa Ndiweni
(United National Federal Party)
Broke with Chirau and the transitional govt. early this year to form a Ndebele-based party. Would be a stalking horse for Nkomo in the election.



Chief Jeremiah Chirau
(Zimbabwe United People's Organization)
Generally considered a "stooge" of the whites, but recently has taken a more independent position calling for an all parties conference before the election and the disbanding of all auxiliary forces.

SECRET

2

13 April 1979

SECRET


Muzorewa reportedly has considered offering Sithole the presidency, but only if Sithole admitted defeat at the polls and agreed to play a subordinate role in the new government. Although many whites would like to see Sithole as president, he is unlikely to agree to these conditions. (S NF NC OC)

Although Sithole has boasted publicly that his party will win as many as 57 seats in the House, his recent actions suggest that he expects to fare poorly and may be contemplating new alliances. His prospects would improve if he could win a strong Ndebele vote. Early last month, Sithole told a representative of Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) that he wanted to meet with Nkomo to explore the possibility of a reconciliation with him. Last week, a spokesman for Sithole's party announced that the two leaders had been in contact, and that Sithole is prepared to offer Nkomo the presidency and give his deputies positions in the Parliament, the civil service, and the diplomatic corps if he wins the election. Sithole said that he thought there was an even chance Nkomo would agree to serve as president with Sithole as prime minister. (S NF NC OC)

Sithole withdrew the offer to turn several parliamentary seats over to ZAPU the next day--presumably because of the hostile reaction it provoked within his own party--but he has renewed the offer to support Nkomo as president. Nkomo has rejected any suggestion that he might be willing to make peace with the winners of this month's election, saying that he would not go back to Rhodesia and charging--probably correctly--that Sithole's offer was no more than a ruse designed to attract Ndebele votes. (U) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

13 April 1979

Formation of Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia



13 April 1979

604104

25X1A



RHODESIA: ELECTION TIMETABLE

| | |
|-------------|--|
| 10 April | Prime Minister Smith's Rhodesian Front Party wins the 20 directly elected white seats in the House of Assembly. Only four of the seats were contested. |
| 17-21 April | White and black Rhodesians vote for the 72 black seats in the House. Voting will be for party rather than candidate. Parties will select members of the House. |
| 18 April | The Rhodesian Front Party caucuses to select at least 16 nominees for the eight indirectly elected white seats in the House. |
| 23 April | Counting of votes for 72 black and 20 white seats begins. |
| 26 April | Whites meet, if necessary, in an electoral college to pare down to 16 the list of white nominees for the indirectly elected seats. |
| 27 April | Electoral results should be announced by this date. |
| 7 May | The newly elected black and white House members elect eight white members to the House, bringing the total House membership to 100. |
| 15 May | Nominations for 10 black and 10 white Senators are solicited by nomination court. |

13 April 1979

- 17 May The Council of Chiefs elects five Shona and five Ndebele chiefs to the Senate.
- 23 May White members of the House elect 10 whites to the Senate; black members of the House elect 10 blacks to the Senate.
- * Parliament is dissolved.
- * The new parliament is formed and the House and the Senate elect Speakers.
- * Parliament nominates and elects a "nonexecutive" President.
- * The President appoints a Prime Minister.
- * Acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, the President appoints a Cabinet.

The above article is Unclassified.

*Date not set.

13 April 1979

25X1A



South Africa - US: Deteriorating Relations With the
United States (U)

The expulsion of US diplomats on 12 April makes clear that the short period of South African good will toward the United States that followed Secretary Vance's visit to Pretoria last fall is over and that the South African Government has reverted to the anti-US posturing that marked the 1977 parliamentary election campaign. Prime Minister Botha believes that South Africa was deceived in the development of the UN Secretary General's report on Namibia and the government is currently making public attacks on US United Nations Ambassador McHenry. The South Africans probably also feel that by blaming the West, they have a convenient excuse for further stalling on the Namibian negotiations. (S)

The recent anti-US pronouncements may also be part of internal political maneuvering by Prime Minister Botha's government to heal the party rifts caused by the revelations of the Information Department scandal. The onus of the scandal would be off the government to some extent if the underhanded dealings of South Africa in the United States could be justified as necessary evils to combat a hostile Washington. Some of the rekindled animosity may also stem from South Africa's successful management of its current oil crisis. The long-dreaded specter of sanctions may seem less frightening now that the country is actually coping with the effects of a massive oil cutoff. (S)

The South African Government is also reviving the southern African regional cooperation policies of both the Verwoerd and Vorster eras. The Prime Minister talks of nonalignment and a "wall of steel" (presumably South African military might) around a group of states that is to include Rhodesia and Namibia. In readjusting its foreign policy, South Africa is again making clear to the outside world that it is pivotal to progress in the area. (S)

13 April 1979

SECRET

While publicly vilifying the West, South Africans still hanker for Western acceptance, and they have not given up hope of being taken back into the fold. In this context, they view the prospect of the election of a conservative government in the United Kingdom as working to their advantage, particularly if the conservatives stick to their campaign promises to eschew economic sanctions. The South Africans continue to feel that, despite what they perceive as negative results in many of their dealings with the US Government, South Africa has a wide sympathetic audience in the United States whose opinions are not reflected in current US policy.

(S) (SECRET)

13 April 1979

8
SECRET

25X1A

Black Africa: Relations With Israel (U)

An Israeli delegation headed by Ehud Auriel, an adviser to Foreign Minister Dayan, reportedly was well received in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Liberia, and Togo during a recent official visit, but no promises were made to reestablish diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations is probably causing some African moderates to rethink their policy and to search for ways to resume what were in many cases friendly and mutually beneficial relations with Israel. The Israelis are not pushing matters, in large part because Israeli commercial interests are thriving in Africa even without formal ties. (C)

Background

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Israel established diplomatic ties with most black African states, many of which had only recently gained their independence. The Africans especially valued Israel's expertise in agricultural, military, medical, and other technical matters. Israel, in return, was able to count on the votes or at least the sympathetic neutrality of a large bloc of black states at the UN and within the Organization of African Unity to repel Arab efforts to turn these bodies into anti-Israeli forums. (S)

Arab offers of financial assistance, below-market oil prices, and political backing on southern African issues began to undercut Israel's support by the early 1970s. This trend was capped during and immediately after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war when almost all African governments cut ties with Tel Aviv in a display of solidarity with the Arabs. Today Israel maintains formal relations only with Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland, and interests sections in Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Kenya. (S)

13 April 1979

Visit of Israeli Delegation

According to Hanan Aynor, director of the Israeli Foreign Ministry's African department and a member of the delegation, all of the countries visited wanted to improve relations with Israel. Several intimated that the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty might help break the ice, leading Aynor to speculate that some moderates might try to coordinate a simultaneous resumption of relations. (C)

Aynor believes that Ivory Coast and Liberia probably will be among the first to reestablish ties, followed by Ghana, Upper Volta, and Kenya. Ghana probably will wait until a new civilian government is installed this summer before making any decision. Aynor doubts that Nigeria, despite active discussion within the government, will reestablish relations because of concern over Israeli - South African ties. He also speculated that Senegal would not soon reestablish ties because of its support for the Palestine Liberation Organization. (C)

The Israelis perceive West African moderates as disillusioned with the Arabs. Extravagant Arab promises of assistance frequently have not been implemented. Limited aid often has been offset by steep oil price increases. (C)

Israeli Commercial Interests

Israeli Foreign Ministry specialists on Africa remain ambivalent about prospects for improving Israel's political position in black Africa. They clearly hope to resume formal relations at least with many of the key moderates in the region. But they deny making great efforts to woo the Africans and instead seem to be waiting for them to make the first move. (C)

Given the ability of Israeli business and trade interests to prosper in Africa even without formal ties, Israeli officials probably believe that they have little reason to push matters. According to Aynor, nearly 5,000 Israelis now are working on the continent. Israeli-African trade has grown to a considerably greater volume than before the 1973 war, reportedly exceeding \$100 million in 1978. Israeli construction firms have secured contracts

13 April 1979

worth nearly \$1 billion, with nearly \$400 million in contracts in Ivory Coast alone. Solel Boneh, a large construction firm owned by Israel's huge Histadrut labor federation, reportedly has more equipment operating in Nigeria than in Israel. (C) (SECRET)

13 April 1979

25X1A

Seychelles: Rene's Fears of a Coup (U)

The hastily arranged port call at Victoria of a Soviet Kresta-I class cruiser on 10 April was probably prompted by Seychellois President Rene's fears of an externally mounted coup attempt, and could portend closer relations between Moscow and Victoria. Very few Soviet warships have called at the Seychelles since the islands' independence in 1976 and, unlike the unannounced visit of the Kresta-I, previous calls were planned well in advance. Rene's concern over a possible coup also led him to request military support from Tanzania, which was unable to cooperate, and from Madagascar, which has sent over 200 troops in the past week to defend Mahe, the Seychelles' main island. The Seychellois police have arrested a Belgian citizen who they claim is a professional mercenary sent by former Seychellois President Mancham to make the final preparations for an impending mercenary invasion. (S NF NC OC)

It is difficult to tell whether Rene's fears of a coup are real or imagined. He came to power by overthrowing Mancham in June 1977 and is convinced that Mancham intends to unseat him. Mancham, who resides in London, probably has not been actively planning a coup, although he may recently have sent agents into the islands to organize an underground opposition movement.* (S NF NC OC)

The Soviets probably offered to send the cruiser, and the arrangements to allow the Soviet ship to call in Victoria probably began in Madagascar. The Soviet Ambassador to the Seychelles was in Madagascar at the same time Seychellois pro-Soviet Foreign Minister Michel was there arranging for Malagasy troop support. (S NF NC OC)

*Members of Mancham's former party, the Seychelles Democratic Party, have not met openly since February 1978, when Rene outlawed their political activities. Rene's announcement last month of a new constitution that provides for a one-party state formally ended all legal political opposition. (S NF NC OC)

13 April 1979

SECRET

The Soviets probably believe that a show of the flag at a time when Rene feels unusually threatened might soften his suspicions of Moscow. Moscow has in the past been eager to assist Third World nations facing coup attempts and provided a similar show of force in Guinea in the early 1970s. The Soviets might also want to take advantage of Rene's recent suspicions of US intentions in the Indian Ocean. Rene, who recently expressed concern in a letter to President Carter over reports of US plans to increase its presence on Diego Garcia, may also intend the Kresta visit as another way of signaling his displeasure over a possible US naval buildup. (S NF NC OC)

Rene's decision to call in Malagasy troops indicates that he lacks confidence that his Tanzanian-trained 250-man army, augmented with a small militia and police, could deter or defeat a mercenary invasion. Seychellois Minister for Internal Affairs Berlouis had requested a company of Tanzanian troops during his visit to Dar es Salaam last month, but Nyerere was unwilling to provide assistance because of the conflict in Uganda. Malagasy President Ratsiraka, who also constantly fears a coup, was probably sympathetic to Rene, who he regards as the only other truly progressive leader in the Indian Ocean island community. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

13 April 1979

13
SECRET

SECRET

25X1A



Nigeria: Election Scheduling Problems (U)

Head of State Obasanjo's recent announcement that state and national elections will take place at weekly intervals between July and September is the latest indication that Lagos has little appreciation for the immense logistical problems involved in conducting a reasonably efficient election. Unless the government is able to overcome these problems, it runs the risk of being confronted with stormy elections and controversial results, which could prompt the military regime to cancel its commitment to return Nigeria to civilian rule in October. (S)

Since the government lifted the 12-year ban on political activity last fall, its efforts to prepare the way for elections have been marked by bureaucratic inefficiency, logistical problems, and poor planning. The federal electoral commission, which is in charge of carrying out the elections, remains committed to setting up just under 100,000 polling stations throughout the country--one for every 500 voters--which will be manned by 125,000 poll clerks, 25,000 counting clerks, and some 300,000 additional personnel. Little has been done to recruit or train these people, however, and voting supplies and equipment are not in place. Neither has the government been very successful in acquainting the largely illiterate rural population--the majority of the 48.3 million registered voters--with the various party candidates and issues, which could present numerous opportunities for voter manipulation and electoral fraud. (C)

By putting off the elections until July, the ruling military council's efforts to get out the vote will be hampered by Nigeria's rainy season. Problems will be most serious in the rural areas, where villages are frequently isolated by roads that are flooded or otherwise impassable. Transporting voters to their respective polling places on at least five separate occasions will put a severe strain on Nigeria's weak transport system. Lagos

13 April 1979

SECRET

SECRET

may decide to combine some of the elections, but a substantial share of the voters have never participated in an election before and could have difficulties in handling more than one contest at a time. (S)

Election problems will be complicated by the fact that the rains vary by region in both intensity and duration. According to the US Embassy, most of the voting will take place in August when the rains are the heaviest in the north, the home base of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). Most Nigerians consider the NPN the front-runner among the five recognized political parties. On the other hand, the rains drop off substantially during August in southern Nigeria, where the Unity Party of Nigeria--the NPN's leading opponent--has its greatest strength. (C)

Voter turnout in the north may also be affected by the concurrent observance of the Muslim holiday of Ramadan, a period of fasting when Muslims are traditionally lethargic and personal tensions are abnormally high. This year, Ramadan begins on approximately 24 July and concludes on 23 August with a major festival that may coincide with the presidential election. Such a prevailing mood could easily spark renewed incidences of violence and disrupt the electoral process. A low voter turnout might also prompt a northern backlash if regional politicians believe the military government deliberately delayed the elections to impede Muslim efforts to win the presidency. (S) (SECRET)

13 April 1979

15
SECRET

SECRET

FOR THE RECORD (U)

CONGO: Col. Denis Sassou Nguesso, who replaced Joachim Yhomby Opango as interim president in an intraparty squabble last February, was unanimously elected President and Chairman of the ruling Congolese Workers Party on 31 March. Although Sassou is considered to be more leftist and pro-Soviet than Yhomby, the political direction of the new government remains unclear. In any event, Sassou, recognizing Congo's need for Western aid, has indicated that the country will remain open to international cooperation, especially with the United States and France. (S)

Congo's inherent economic problems--a bloated civil service, meager resources, a restive labor force, and a large unemployed urban population--will continue to threaten the country's political stability and challenge Sassou's leadership abilities. Sassou, whose election continues a 10-year tradition of northern minority rule, will also have to contend with the increasing southern influence and the ambitious political maneuvering of two high-level southern colleagues, Prime Minister Sylvain-Goma and political bureau member Thystere-Tchicaya. In addition, the decision by the Party Congress to prosecute Yhomby on charges of high treason could also cause problems for Sassou. Sassou probably fears that Yhomby's trial could trigger a reinvestigation of the assassination in 1976 of the late President Marien Ngouabi and that he could be implicated by such a probe. (S) (SECRET)

25X1A

MAURITIUS: The Mauritian Foreign Ministry announced on 10 April that Mauritius and Cuba have agreed to establish diplomatic relations. Relations will be mainly symbolic, however, because the two countries will not exchange resident Ambassadors. The Mauritian Ambassador in Washington will be accredited to Havana, and Cuba's Ambassador in Madagascar will serve concurrently as Ambassador to Port Louis. The two countries' decision is tied to the Nonaligned Conference scheduled to take place in Havana in September. Mauritian Prime Minister Ramgoolam expects a personal invitation to the meeting from President Castro, and by establishing diplomatic ties Ramgoolam hopes to avoid embarrassment over not having previous contact with Cuba. The Cubans believe

13 April 1979

SECRET

SECRET

they can improve their image among the nonaligned countries by establishing ties with smaller, moderate nations that distrust them. The pro-Western Labor government in Mauritius long has been concerned over Cuban activities in Africa and has supported the efforts of moderate states at previous conferences to restrain the Cubans' attempts to radicalize the nonaligned movement. (S NF NC OC)
(SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON) [REDACTED] OPA,
[REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

13 April 1979

SECRET

25X1A

ABSTRACT OF RECENT PUBLICATION

A New Government for Uganda* (U)

Now that the invading Tanzanian and anti-Amin Ugandan forces have established control over Kampala, installing and gaining recognition of a new Ugandan government will be their next order of business:

- The Ugandan National Liberation Front is the leading candidate for the role of successor government.
- The Front is a coalition of long-time rivals hastily put together last month under Tanzanian auspices. It has geographical balance, but little political cohesion.
- Formation of the Front dims the prospects of former Ugandan President Obote, long regarded as Tanzania's favored candidate to succeed Amin.
- Once it is in place in Uganda, a Liberation Front government will encounter deep-seated ethnic, religious, and political divisions as well as resentment from those who remained in Uganda throughout the Amin years. (S NF NC OC)

The 2,000-man exile army did not give a very impressive account of itself in the war against Amin, but it may yet become an arbiter of power:

- Obote apparently has many supporters in the exile army and reportedly believes he can use this force to intimidate the Front's civilian leadership after the war is over. Ambitious commanders might, however, use the troops to wrest control for themselves. (S NF NC OC)

*These key judgments are taken from A New Government for Uganda, PA79-10184, April 1979. A copy of the assessment may be obtained from the author. (U)

13 April 1979

18
SECRET

Restoring the Ugandan economy to full productivity will be a two-to-three-year proposition at best:

- Agriculture--the principal sector--should revive readily but the economy's once well developed infrastructure is a shambles. (U)

Tanzania will face some hard decisions about its future role in Uganda:

- Maintaining the military force currently in Uganda is a heavy economic drain, even if no effort is made to occupy the remaining two-thirds of the country.
- Prolonged support of a new regime in Uganda--basically a richer country than Tanzania--could cause discontent at home. (S)

In foreign affairs, since Kenya controls the transit routes to Uganda its approval of a new regime will be crucial:

- Not only are its own relations with Tanzania strained, but Kenya also shares the apprehension of most African countries that Tanzania's intervention in Uganda may establish a dangerous precedent.
- The Soviet Union--the major military supplier of both Uganda and Tanzania--may emerge as a prime contender to assist the rebuilding of the Ugandan military forces. (S) (SECRET NO-FORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

13 April 1979

Secret

Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010038-9

Secret

Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010038-9